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Herding Katz: GPS Tracking and Society's
Expectations of Privacy in the 21 st Century
by ZACHARY GRAY*
I. Introduction
For nearly forty-four years, the United States Supreme Court has
adhered to the same, remarkably resilient "test" for its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.! In what may be criminal procedure's
most famous concurring opinion, Justice Harlan articulated the Katz
two-prong test to determine whether police action constitutes a
search. To amount to a search, the Court must find "first, that a
person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."'2 If police actions do amount to a search,
"[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions."' That is to say, if the police conduct
a search and do so without a warrant, it will usually be considered a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. To remedy a Fourth
Amendment violation, the Supreme Court has adopted the
"exclusionary rule" that states, "evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in court."4
With the admission of critical evidence on the line, it should be no
surprise that the threshold issue of whether a police action amounts
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1. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Id. at 361 (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 357.
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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to a search has become one of the most thoroughly litigated areas in
the field of criminal law.
Despite the impressive endurance of the Katz two-prong test, the
ensuing holdings from the application of this rule have been anything
but consistent. The Supreme Court's subsequent rulings have
resulted in "a series of inconsistent and bizarre results" that have left
law professors, students, and lower courts struggling to determine
whether or not state action constitutes a "search."' Scholarly
consensus appears to blame this phenomenon on the test itself;'
asking typical questions like "Who is 'society' and how do Supreme
Court Justices know what it thinks?"' But if this criticism explains the
apparent failure of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
one must be prepared to question much more than the Court's Fourth
Amendment analysis. The entire premise of tort law is founded on
the "reasonable person standard" and if our juries can adequately
define a "reasonable person" then there is no reason our courts
should not be able to accurately channel the beliefs of a "society"
presumably composed of such "reasonable" people.
Regardless of the explanation, in the decades since Katz was
decided, the judiciary's application has yielded unpredictable and
often inconsistent results. With the availability of increasingly
technologically sophisticated tools available to law enforcement, its
struggles have been exacerbated. This struggle is exemplified by the
federal circuit courts' recent attempts to determine whether the use of
GPS tracking devices constitutes a search within the current
conception of the Fourth Amendment. As of 2012, they were divided
on the issue, with the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits concluding
that the use of GPS tracking was not a search" and the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals9 concluding otherwise. However, the circuit courts
5. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seiderman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 29 (1988).
6. See Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1078-80 (1987); see also Sherry F.
Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some
Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
7. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503,505 (2007).
8. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
1534 (2012); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). All three
held that the placement and utilization of tracking devices did not constitute a search.
9. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the
placement and use of GPS tracking device did constitute a search).
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unanimously agreed that the issue would be analyzed under the Katz
framework."
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court decided the circuit
courts were all in error. The Court resolved its first GPS tracking case
not on the basis of the Katz two-prong test, but on the basis of
common-law trespass doctrine." Ultimately, the Court held that the
dispositive issue was the government's intrusion in a constitutionally
protected space, which occurred when they placed the tracking device
on Jones' vehicle." In a majority opinion invoking mid-eighteenth
century British tort law," Justice Scalia found it may be true that GPS
tracking "without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer
that question." 4 In the end, the Court declined to rule on whether
the government's use of GPS, or any other technology to monitor an
individual's every movement constituted a search within the Katz
framework."
Assuming it is true that history has a habit of repeating itself, the
day will soon arrive when resolving the issue of GPS tracking on the
basis of trespass doctrine will no longer suffice. As discussed infra,"
the Katz two-prong test was itself developed in response to the
inescapable reality that technological advances had rendered physical
trespass-doctrine woefully insufficient for protecting society's right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Consequently,
there will soon be a day when our courts will have no choice but to
determine whether such ubiquitous tracking methods impinge upon a
reasonable expectation of privacy. This paper attempts to contribute
to the resolution of this inevitable issue in several ways. At a basic
level, it asks whether or not individual members of society believe
that the use of GPS technology to track individuals violates
reasonable social expectations of privacy. After surveying more than
300 individuals, the answer is yes. Second, this paper explores why
our courts have had such trouble reaching consistent results in their
10. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d at 277; Marquez, 605 F.3d at 609-10; Pineda-Moreno, 591
F.3d at 1217; Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
11. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
12. Id. at 951.
13. Id. at 949 (citing Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.)).
14. Id. at 954.
15. Id.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1967).
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application of Katz. Contrary to the suggestions of some scholars,
this paper argues that the problem lies not in some intrinsic deficiency
with the Katz two-prong test. Instead, this paper demonstrates that
the problem lies in the proxy tests that have evolved since the advent
of Katz, tests that have led the court astray from the original inquiry
contemplated by Justice Harlan. Finally, it suggests basic doctrinal
changes to harmonize society's contemporary expectations of privacy
with existing case precedent.
II. Setting the Stage for Jones
A. Origins of the Court's Contemporary Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Katz was the first in a line of cases that asked the Supreme Court
to balance the competing interests of civil liberties and public safety,
particularly in light of advanced and (at the time) cutting-edge
technological innovations employed by law enforcement. While
technological breakthroughs were by no means the advent of the
1960s, this period was unique because it was the first time in history
that law enforcement had the tools to infiltrate previously
impenetrable barriers to infringe on privacy interests that
traditionally would have been taken for granted as being free from
government intrusion. In light of these advances, the Court pivoted
toward a new paradigm for Fourth Amendment analysis that no
longer revolved around the physical penetration of a constitutionally
protected area."
In Katz, the defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering
information by telephone.20 As evidence of the crime, the
Government introduced a recording of the defendant's conversation."
FBI agents obtained evidence of the conversation by placing a
recording device on the outside of the public telephone booth used by
the defendant.22 In deciding whether this method of obtaining
evidence violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, Justice
18. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: An
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1107 (1987) (describing a court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as "distressingly unmanageable.").
19. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. In doing so, the Supreme Court explicitly overruled
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942), both of which relied upon trespass doctrine to define the scope of Fourth
Amendment protections.
20. Id. at 348.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Stewart eloquently redefined the scope of the Fourth Amendment
when he announced, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places."23
Moreover, in Katz, Justice Stewart articulated a new delineation
between public and private-"[wjhat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected."24  In the concurrence, Justice Harlan established the
critical inquiry into whether government action constituted a search
i.e. the two-prong test, requiring courts to consider (1) whether the
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy and if so, (2)
whether that expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable." The Katz holding revolutionized America's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Most importantly, the Fourth
Amendment would no longer be constrained by the public/private
divide and by a simplistic analysis of physical location. Or would it?
B. On the Road to GPS: Beepers and Transmitters, Knotts and Karo
By the early 1980s, technology had advanced so as to enable
police to place beepers (radio transmitters) on or in objects of interest
and then to track the object at a distance by using a receiver, which
would register the proximity of the beeper based on the strength of
the signal. The technology presented authorities with a valuable tool
that enabled them to track items beyond their visual range, so long as
the transmitter and the receiver were within operating distance of one
another. Authorities were quick to utilize this technology and it was
not long before the Supreme Court would be afforded the chance to
rule on whether the use of these devices constituted a search under
the Katz analysis.2 6 But by the time that the Court finally heard
United States v. Karo" and United States v. Knotts,' Justice Stewart's
extension of Fourth Amendment protection to public areas fell on
deaf ears and in both cases the Court held that when the suspect was
23. Id. at 351-52.
24. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 361.
26. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983).
27. 468 U.S. at 705.
28. 460 U.S. at 276.
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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traveling on "public" roads, he had no reasonable expectation of
privacy.
The Supreme Court heard Knotts" and Karo' in 1983 and 1984
respectively. Less than two decades after declaring that Fourth
Amendment analysis would no longer be constrained to a
determination of "whether or not a given 'area', viewed in the
abstract is 'constitutionally protected,'". it appeared as though the
analysis would once again be determined by physical location.
Perhaps the greatest evidence that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
was devolving to protect places and not people can be found in the
reasoning employed by the Court in these two decisions. Both cases
presented similar factual scenarios and involved state agents placing
beepers in containers that were subsequently transferred to the
possession of the defendants.' In Knotts, the beeper was placed in a
drum of chloroform, which was picked up by the defendant, who was
then trailed by police to a Wisconsin cabin." In Karo, the officers
placed a beeper in a can of ether and proceeded to monitor its
movements over the course of several months." However, unlike
Knotts" the officers in Karo continued to monitor the location of the
ether while it was located in the defendant's home.3 ' This would turn
out to be the decisive issue, as Knotts held that the use of the beeper
did not constitute a search," while the Karo court concluded it was a
"search," but only insofar as the tracking device was used on his
private property.' In so holding, the Karo court affirmed that the use
of the beeper to track movements on public streets did not constitute
a search and did not implicate the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights."
In her article, Kaitlyn Kerrain explored the two decisions and
identified the public exposure consideration as paramount to the
30. Karo, 468 U.S. at 731-32 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
31. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276.
32. Karo, 468 U.S. at 705.
33. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
34. Karo 468 U.S. at 708; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278, 286.
35. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278-79.
36. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-11.
37. Knotts, 460 U.S at 278-79 ("The record before us does not reveal that the beeper
was used after the location in the area of the cabin had been initially determined.").
38. Karo, 468 U.S. at 710.
39. Knotts, 460 U.S at 285.
40. Karo, 468 U.S. at 735.
41. Id. at 730-31.
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Courts' conclusions that using a beeper to track the movements on
public property did not constitute a search.42 In both cases, the Court
found that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists where the
defendant's movements are publicly exposed and thus such actions
did not invoke the privacy expectations necessary to trigger a
"search" as defined by Katz and the Fourth Amendment. In short,
the analysis now turned on whether someone or something was
theoretically exposed to the public eye. The Court was quick to point
out the tracking took place on "public thoroughfares" and therefore
the expectation of privacy was lessened." By superficially relying on
the simple fact that the defendant was publicly exposed, the Court fell
back on the same argument the Katz court explicitly rejected.4 In
Katz, the government argued that because the phone booth was made
of glass, the defendant was publicly visible and therefore could not
reasonably assert an expectation of privacy." Justice Stewart rejected
this argument, pointing out that "what [the defendant] sought to
exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it was
the uninvited ear." 47 Yet this fact-that just because the defendants
in Knotts and Karo were publicly visible did not mean they had
necessarily waived their expectation of privacy-eluded the Court in
both instances. Consequently, by adopting the public exposure
doctrine, the Court came full circle back to the very problem it had
attempted to address in Katz: the simplistic link between Fourth
Amendment and physical trespass.
HI. Circuit Court Rulings on Fourth Amendment GPS Cases
A. Pineda-Moreno, Marquez, Cuevas-Perez
The beginning of the 21st century introduced a series of federal
appellate cases asking circuit courts to rule on the constitutionality of
using GPS devices in the absence of a search warrant. Given the
nature of our common law system and its emphasis on stare decisis, it
was only natural that these courts would look to Supreme Court
precedent for guidance. The question then was whether the Court
42. Kaitlyn A. Kerrane, Keeping Up With Officer Jones: A Comprehensive Look at
the Fourth Amendment and GPS Surveillance, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1716 (2011).
43. Id.
44. Knotts, 460 U.S at 281.
45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 at 352 (1967).
46. Id.
47. Id.
Fall 20121 HERDING KATZ 151
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ruled on a sufficiently similar issue to guide the lowers courts'
decision-making process. According to the Seventh, Eighth and
Ninth Circuits, the answer was yes.' These courts held that Knotts
already determined that "a person travelling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another"4 9 and therefore, the use of
GPS devices to track vehicles on public roads was clearly not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The first circuit court to deal with this issuese was the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard United States v. Pineda-
Moreno in January of 2010." The court dealt predominantly with
issues concerning when, where, and how the device was placed on the
vehicle.52 Much of the decision centered on the fact that the vehicle
was parked in the curtilage when the device was planted and relegates
the actual monitoring of the device as a secondary issue." But Mr.
Pineda-Moreno's last claim dealt with the actual use of the device,
arguing, "Knotts should not control his case because the [Supreme]
Court heavily modified the Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to
such technological devices in Kyllo."
The court replied that Mr. Pineda-Moreno "misstates the
relationship between the two cases."" The court went on to attribute
Mr. Pineda-Moreno with contending that "officers conduct a 'search'
whenever they use sense-enhancing technology not available to the
general public to obtain information."" Had this been Mr. Pineda-
Moreno's contention he would clearly have misinterpreted the
48. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
1534 (2012); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).
49. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); See, e.g., Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214.
50. It should be noted that there were previous circuit court decisions, but this was
the first in the line of widely recognized cases leading to the Supreme Court's granting of
certiorari to United States v. Jones.
51. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212.
52. Id. at 1214-15.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1216. In Kyllo, the Court held that using thermal imaging technology to
obtain "any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a
search-at least where the technology in question is not in general use." Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
55. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.
56. Id.
152 [Vol. 40:1
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holding in Kyllo, but this was not the case. He was actually arguing
that Kyllo be applied in full to require that a search only occurs when
officers use sense-enhancing technology not otherwise available to
the public to obtain information not otherwise lawfully obtainable." If
his argument is understood to include this caveat, the assertion
becomes vastly more reasonable and would seem to strike a
reasonable balance between our civil liberties and public safety
considerations. Instead, the court fell back on a simplistic analysis of
whether the search took place in a "constitutionally protected area,"
an analysis that although explicitly disavowed by the Court forty-
three years prior in Katz," would prove dispositive in Jones."
The next case at the circuit court level attacked the issue head
on, arguing simply that Knotts did not control on the facts alone.
Four months after Pineda-Moreno was published, the Eighth Circuit
decided United States v. Marquez in May 2010." In Marquez, the
court held that the defendant did not actually have standing since he
neither owned nor drove the vehicle on which the device was
attached.6 ' Nonetheless, the court went out of its way to state that
even if he did have standing, Knotts foreclosed the argument that
GPS tracking on public roads constitutes a search.62 The court did
acknowledge the concern expressed by Judge Posner in a previous
decision that "the cost of technology is decreasing while the ability of
police to monitor and install such devices is increasing," enabling
"wholesale surveillance" by attaching devices at random and then
mining the data for possible criminal behavior.63 But the court
dismissed this concern, citing the fact that the police had reasonable
suspicion and thus need not have sought a warrant.' In essence,
though done in dicta, the court created a reasonable suspicion
standard for GPS tracking.
But the greatest illustration of some courts' dogged reliance on
the public-exposure doctrine comes from the Seventh Circuit, which
57. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (the "effort to decide whether or
not a given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'constitutionally protected' deflects attention
from the problem presented...").
59. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
60, 605 F.3d 604,604 (8th Cir. 2010).
61. Id. at 609.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007)).
64. Id.
Fall 20121 HERDING KA TZ 153
heard the case of United States v. Cuevas-Perez in 2011.65 In Cuevas-
Perez, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents suspected the
defendant of being involved in a drug-distribution ring." After
lawfully obtaining video footage of the defendant altering the panels
and rear hatch on his vehicle so as to create hidden compartments,
police officers decided to place a GPS tracking unit on the suspect's
Jeep. The particular tracking device used was capable of sending
text messages every four minutes to the detective's cellular phone to
keep him apprised of the suspect's location.6 Unlike Pineda-Moreno
and Marquez, where police tracked suspects with GPS devices for
four and five months respectively, the detective in this case used the
device to track the suspect for a sixty-hour road-trip through Phoenix,
Arizona to the Illinois border." Upon reaching Illinois, the suspect
was detained for a traffic violation, during which authorities
discovered heroin in the paneling and roof of the vehicle.70
In its holding, the court explicitly stated that "[t]he foundational
Supreme Court precedent for GPS-related cases is United States v.
Knotts, which held that the use of a beeper device to track a drug
suspect did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not
amount to a search or seizure."" To bolster its contention that Knotts
provided the proper analysis, the court noted the relatively short
duration of the tracking time (sixty hours, as opposed to a period of
one month) and the fact that the tracking was limited in scope, i.e., a
single trip from Arizona to Illinois.72 Having established the
framework for its analysis, the Seventh Circuit adopted the same
language, and thus rationale, employed by the Supreme Court in
Knotts. Namely, that a "person travelling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another."7 Since the suspect had no
65. United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011).
66. Id. at 272.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 273.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 273 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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reasonable expectation, the action did not constitute a search and
therefore did not implicate the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.
Of all three cases, Cuevas-Perez unequivocally involved facts
most similar to those dealt with in Knotts. It follows then, that the
"principal rationale for allowing warrantless tracking of beepers ...
that beepers are merely a more effective means of observing what is
already public,"" could reasonably be applied to the Cuevas-Perez
case. However, the court did acknowledge that if the facts had been
different, the aspects of the case might favor the finding of a search;76
aspects that were present in a case decided prior to Cuevas-Perez by
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. Maynard and the Mosaic Theory"
With Marquez and Pineda-Moreno decided," it appeared the
principle that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
simply did not apply to GPS tracking.' Warrantless tracking, even
over the course of months, was deemed lawful so long as it took place
in public places. Fourth Amendment analysis had regressed. In
seeking to determine whether society would deem an expectation of
privacy to be reasonable, courts had chosen the public/private divide
as its proxy test, in spite of Katz's prohibition on doing so." So long
as GPS tracking devices were analyzed in the framework of Knotts,
this result was inevitable.
Then came Maynard, a case that began in 2004 when an FBI
taskforce began to suspect Mr. Maynard and Mr. Jones (the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mr. Jones' name) of narcotics
violations.' The investigation involved conspiracy, wiretaps, GPS
surveillance and took place over the span of more than a year."
Ultimately, in October of 2005 the two were charged with conspiracy
to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and
cocaine base, among other counts." The case involved a number of
74. Id. at 276.
75. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.
76. Cuevas-Perez, 640 U.S. at 274.
77. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
78. Cuevas-Perez would come shortly after Maynard.
79. See supra Part III.A
80. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
81. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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complex issues, but one that the D.C. Circuit focused on was whether
the use of a GPS tracking device continuously over the course of
twenty-eight days constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment." In a break from its sister circuits, the D.C. Circuit
determined that Knotts did not control this case because Knotts
"explicitly distinguished between the limited information discovered
by the use of the beeper-movements during a discrete journey-and
more comprehensive and sustained monitoring of the sort at issue in
this case."' In fact, the court noted that Knotts itself foresaw this very
distinction when it stated, "[i]f such dragnet-type law enforcement
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will
be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable."" As the Maynard court saw it, that
day and time had come and the question was not whether new
principles applied, but what those new principles would be.
Most importantly, the D.C. Circuit was the first court to
recognize the limitations of Knotts; "Knotts held only that a 'person
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another,' not that such a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements whatsoever, world without end."" Having
freed from the constraint of Knotts, the court was able to apply the
facts at hand to the foundational test laid out in Katz-whether the
defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and whether
that expectation was one which society was prepared to accept as
reasonable." The court first addressed the public observation
consideration,89 the notion that if the actions took place where they
could be publicly observed there can be no reasonable expectation of
privacy. To do so, the court invoked what has been considered the
"Mosaic Theory," which suggests, "[tihe whole of one's movements
over the course of a month is not constructively exposed to the public
because, like a rap sheet, that whole reveals far more than the
individual movements it comprises."" It went on to articulate the
myriad of invasive conclusions about one's private life that could be
84. Id. at 555.
85. Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
86. Id. (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 557 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281) (emphasis added).
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
89. Kerrane, supra note 42, at 1710.
90. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561-62 (emphasis added).
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drawn from ubiquitous monitoring, that would otherwise be
implausible by monitoring discrete, singular movements.? Indeed,
the whole is much greater than the sum of its parts.
Having concluded that movements were not constructively
exposed, the court went on to consider the possibility that the
defendant's movements were actually exposed, thereby negating a
reasonable expectation of privacy.? The court adopted a probabilistic
inquiry' that determines "not what another person may physically
and lawfully do but rather what a reasonable person expects another
might actually do."94 Therefore, the proper inquiry was if it was
unreasonable for the defendant not to conclude a watchful eye was
tracking his every movement. Consequently, the court concluded
that his movements were neither constructively, nor actually, exposed
and thereby allowed itself to focus on Katz, rather than becoming tied
up in Knotts."
For the first time as applied to GPS cases, the court was able to
faithfully channel the spirit that led Justice Stewart to opine that, "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."" The court
reiterated that a "person does not leave his privacy behind when he
walks out his front door," and unlike past courts which applied Katz
to GPS surveillance, pointed out that Katz "clearly stated what [one]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected."' To bolster its conclusion that
society would concur that Mr. Maynard's expectations of privacy
were reasonable, the court pointed to the fact that the California
legislature, as well as a number of other state legislatures, had all
adopted statutes requiring the police to obtain a warrant before
placing a tracking device on people's vehicles." Although the
California legislature is not a proxy for nation-wide societal
consensus, it was enough for the court to conclude that "[s]ociety
91. Id. at 562.
92. Id. at 555-56.
93. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 508-09 (2007).
94. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559. See also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-
14 (1986).
95. Id. at 559-61.
96. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967).
97. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
98. Id.
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recognizes Jones' expectation of privacy in his movements over the
course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to
monitor those movements defeated that reasonable expectation."9
C. United States v. Jones: The Decision
In a "highly artificial"" decision, the majority opinion-
authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor-affirmed the D.C.
Circuit's holding in Jones, but did so for a dramatically different
reason than the D.C. Circuit.'o Justice Scalia framed the issue by
emphasizing that, "[i]t is important to be clear about what occurred in
this case: The Government physically occupied private property for
the purpose of obtaining information.""" Based on an eighteenth
century English case, Entick v. Carrington, the majority concluded
that there is "no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when it was adopted."" Trespass doctrine, a legal theory that had
proved so wanting in its protection of Fourth Amendment rights that
it was expressly rejected by the Court in favor of the Katz two-prong
test,m was now being revived for the first time in more than forty-five
years. Perhaps even more surprising, it was being invoked in lieu of
the two-prong test, essentially reversing the trajectory taken in Fourth
Amendment case law since the Court's decision in Katz.
The remainder of the decision is devoted to preempting the
arguments made by Justice Alito in his concurrence; that the
appellate court's decision should have been affirmed on the basis of
the two-prong test.' In sum, the majority revived the long dead
common-law trespass doctrine in order to avoid addressing the
"vexing" problem of distinguishing Jones from cases like Knotts and
Karo." To be fair, this response merits consideration and even the
99. Id.
100. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 949.
103. Id. at 950.
104. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (stating that "an actual trespass is
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation").
105. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54.
106. Id. at 954.
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minority struggled to distinguish Jones from its previous cases."
However, the critical observation is that in requiring that Jones be in
some way distinguished from Knotts and Karo, both the majority and
Justice Alito's concurrence implicitly reaffirm the validity of the
public-exposure doctrine underlying the decisions in these cases."e
Where the majority opinion does discuss the public-exposure
doctrine, their discussion is sure to lead to further confusion for
courts and scholars alike. Initially, the Court seemed to affirm the
contemporary application of the doctrine, stating, "to date [the
Court] has not deviated from the understanding that mere visual
observation does not constitute a search." But in the same
paragraph, it seems to suggest a willingness to reconsider the public-
exposure doctrine, opining that GPS tracking could amount to an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy even without the accompanying
trespass.' But rather than taking the opportunity to restore
consistency and predictability to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the majority leaves it to lower courts to continue struggling to
determine whether or not privacy expectations, with respect to acts,
voluntarily publicly exposed, are still per se unreasonable."'
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which he was joined
by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justice Alito immediately
points out that although the majority held that the placement and use
of a GPS device constitutes a search, it is patently unclear from its
opinion how either of the discrete elements of the government's
actions-(1) the placement of the device and (2) the use of the device
to monitor Jones' movements-constitute a search if the Court
accepts the Knotts proposition that the use of a small electronic
device to monitor an individual's movements is not a search."' The
placement alone, as argued by Justice Alito, could not conceivably
amount to a search if, for example, the GPS device failed to work and
therefore no information was obtained from the placement."'
107. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (Justice Alito's only guidance seems to be that
"short-term" tracking does not violate the Fourth Amendment, but that long-term
tracking does.).
108. Id. at 954 (majority opinion); Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 953 (majority opinion).
110. Id. at 954.
111. Id. at 952-53.
112. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
113. Id.
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Assuming arguendo that the analysis must turn on one of these
discrete actions, Justice Alito's concurrence proceeds to examine the
use of the GPS device to monitor Jones' movements, as the only
action that by definition, could constitute a search within the
framework of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."' To determine the
appropriate test, Justice Alito proceeds to articulate the same
argument the Court laid out in Katz establishing the inefficacy of the
trespass doctrine as a prophylactic measure for protecting society's
Fourth Amendment rights."' The concurrence even points out the
Court's language in Karo, a decision cited numerous times by the
majority, states that in "addressing the relevance of a technical
trespass, an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to
establish a constitutional violation.,16
In addition to arguing that the trespass doctrine lacked the legal
sufficiency to adequately resolve Jones, the concurrence also points
out the practical concerns with disposing of the case on such narrow
grounds;"7 there already exists a number of personal devices which
U.S. citizens voluntarily carry and that could easily be utilized to
achieve the same degree of invasive monitoring as undertaken by the
government in Jones."' As Justice Alito notes, "with more than 322
million wireless devices in use in the United States" the government
need only change its method of GPS monitoring to render the
majority's holding irrelevant."9
While the concurring Justices listed four additional shortcomings
of the majority's reliance on trespass-doctrine, the latter three
generally derive from the first-the fundamental fact that:
[T]he Court's reasoning largely disregards what is really
important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term
tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something
that most would view as relatively minor (attaching to the
bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in
any way with the car's operation). Attaching such an object is
114. Id. at 958-59.
115. Id. at 959-60. Katz also cited Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) as indicative of the shortcomings of a
trespass doctrine for Fourth Amendment analysis. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
354 (1967). In fact, Katz expressly overruled these two cases. Id.
116. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (internal citations omitted).




generally regarded as so trivial that it does not provide a basis
for recovery under modern tort law. But under the Court's
reasoning, this conduct may violate the Fourth Amendment.
By contrast, if long-term monitoring can be accomplished
without committing a technical trespass-suppose, for
example, that the Federal Government required or persuaded
auto manufacturers to include a GPS tracking device in every
car-the Court's theory would provide no protection. 20
In discrediting the trespass doctrine and simultaneously
establishing that the use of the GPS device, as opposed to the
placement of the device, is the dispositive issue, the concurrence
established the Katz two-prong test as the preferred means of
resolving the issue before the Court in Jones.121
Although the concurrence disagreed with the majority's mode of
analysis, it did concur in the judgment that the use of the GPS device
to monitor Jones' movements did constitute a search, as it violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy.12  It noted that "[t]he Katz
expectation of privacy test . . . is not without its own difficulties,"
specifically its subjective nature in light of the ever changing
technology and privacy norms." As pointed out by the majority, the
concurring Justices' decision to decide the issue under the rubric of
Katz requires that any holding that a search occurred must be
reconciled with the Court's previous opinions in Knotts and Karo.124
To do so, the concurrence embraced the duration of the monitoring
as the dispositive issue, stating that under its approach "relatively
short-term monitoring of a person's movements on public streets
accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized
as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy."' Unfortunately, beyond seizing on the length of time of
the tracking as potentially dispositive, Justice Alito failed to provide
further guidance as to the point at which GPS tracking would last
long enough to require a warrant."' And while Justice Scalia was
120. Id. at 961 (internal citations omitted).
121. Id. at 962.
122. Id. at 964.
123. Id. at 962.
124. Id. at 954.
125. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
126. Id.
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quick to point this out as a potential problem, he does not appear to
have been compelled to venture an answer either. 7
It was Justice Sotomayor's concurrence that made the most
poignant observations to come out of the Jones opinion. It is fitting
that it was once again a concurrence that reflected the purest
invocation of the ethos of Justice Harlan's famous opinion." More
importantly, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence demonstrated a faithful
application of the two-prong test. Only by adopting the flexible and
subjective approach that is the strength of the Katz two-prong test,
did it enable Justice Sotomayor to probe the Court's otherwise
assumed wisdom and to lay the foundation for a meaningful
exploration of the relevance of cases like Knotts and Karo in the
contemporary era of GPS and Jones.
Although Justice Sotomayor ultimately concluded with the
majority that Jones could be disposed of on the basis of physical
trespass,' the majority of her concurrence is devoted to applying the
facts of Jones to the legal standard established in Katz and also
concurring with the minority of her peers that "at the very least,
longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses
impinges on expectations of privacy."130 But it is Sotomayor's
insightful way of arriving at that conclusion that proves particularly
useful in guiding this discussion of Fourth Amendment protections.
Although this holding alludes to the length of tracking as potentially
significant in determining whether government monitoring violates
reasonable expectations of privacy,m her concurrence embraces a
more holistic analysis of reasonableness and in doing so,
demonstrates that the duration of GPS tracking may ultimately be
irrelevant.
By recognizing that Katz was itself an invention necessitated by
the rapidly evolving technological innovations available to law
enforcement, Justice Sotomayor was unique in her observation that
"GPS monitoring [makes] available at a relatively low cost such a
substantial quantum of intimate information about a person ... [that
it] may alter the relationship between citizen and government in a
127. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
128. Harlan's opinion was itself a concurrence. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
129. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 955.
131. Id.
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way that is inimical to democracy."'3 2 Her recognition of the uniquely
pervasive potential of GPS was the catalyst for her observation that
perhaps GPS tracking requires an altogether different analysis from
the ones applied by the Court in cases like Knotts and Karo. She
alone recognized that the power of GPS tracking is so "inimical" to
our Fourth Amendment rights, that in order to ensure our Fourth
Amendment protections do not rise and fall with technology:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose
the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses
with which they correspond to their Internet service providers;
and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to
online retailers. 33
As discussed above,m Knotts and Karo---cases which both the
majority and Justice Alito's concurrence imply would condone
"short-term" GPS tracking-were based on the legal conclusion that
privacy expectations are nullified once conveyed to the public, now
reexamined by Justice Sotomayor. The willingness to question this
conclusion enabled Justice Sotomayor to expand the scope of her
analysis beyond the issue of how long the tracking took place, since
Knotts and Karo no longer necessarily stand for the proposition that
GPS tracking is permissible, even for short periods of time.
Justice Sotomayor's skepticism directs us to the reconsider the
assumption that society finds unreasonable any privacy expectation in
information voluntarily disclosed, and the research demonstrates that
she is correct to call for the reevaluation of this legal conclusion.
132. Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. at 957 (internal citations omitted).
134. See supra Part II.B.
135. This is not to say that these two cases would be overruled. They would still stand
for the proposition that the use of transmitters utilizing radio signals does not violate
reasonable expectations of privacy. But at the same time, the use of GPS devices under
the same circumstances would violate society's expectations of privacy.
136. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Unconstrained by the legal conclusion that privacy expectations are
extinguished once exposed to the public, Justice Sotomayor was able
to freely contemplate society's privacy expectations from an
unencumbered position-asking "whether people reasonably expect
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."' In
conclusion, Justice Sotomayor wrote, "I do not regard as dispositive
the fact that the Government might obtain the fruits of GPS
monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance techniques."""
It should be no surprise then, that Justice Sotomayor's concurrence
came closest to recognizing and adopting the views of individual
members of society, when asked whether GPS tracking offends their
conceptions of reasonable privacy expectations."'
IV. The Research
A. Data Collection
The Katz Court made a laudable move when it made society the
arbiter of its own Fourth Amendment protections. But before any
further speculation can ensue as to whether the Court has or should
have decided Jones within the framework of the Katz two-prong test,
the principal purpose of the research component of this note was to
ask everyday people whether they believed that GPS tracking
violated their own personal sense of privacy expectations. While
there is no shortage of scholarly proposals for ways to apply the two-
prong test, it would appear that no one has bothered to query
"society" as to its contemporary privacy expectations in light of
Facebook, cookies, and what appears to be the daily encroachment of
technology (be it willfully, voluntarily, or in ignorance) in our daily
lives.
In light of this conspicuous absence, 321 randomly selected
individuals were asked whether they believed the use of GPS tracking
devices constitutes an unjustified infringement on our civil liberties
and whether they have a reasonable expectation of privacy while
generally moving about society. To answer this question, each
respondent was given one of four potential scenarios in which the
police used GPS devices to track an individual's movements. After
137. Id. at 956.
138. Id.
139. See infra Part V.
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reading the hypothetical, respondents were asked to determine
whether the officer's conduct was justified and whether the
individual's privacy was violated24 By distinguishing between
whether the officer was justified and whether the individual's privacy
was violated, it allowed respondents to distinguish their sentiments
about the exercise of police authority and the reasonableness of the
individual's expectation of privacy. This allowed respondents who
believed that the officer's actions were unjustified, yet also felt that
the individual still did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to
answer accordingly; ensuring that people who disagreed with the
officer's actions but did not believe the suspect's privacy was violated
to say so without feeling compelled to agree with the premise that his
privacy was violated to channel their disapproval of the officer's
actions.
The first portion of the survey contained a GPS hypothetical
coming in one of four different variations, loosely adapting the factual
scenarios from Pineda-Moreno and Jones. Version one presented a
scenario in which the police officer's decision to place the tracking
device on the vehicle was based on limited circumstantial evidence.
In this scenario the individual was tracked for four months.14 1 In
version two, the officer placed the tracking device on the vehicle
based on extensive information that the individual was engaged in
cocaine distribution. In version two, the individual was tracked for
the same duration as in version one (four months).42 Versions three
and four parallel versions one and two, differing only with respect to
the length of time that the GPS unit was employed to track the
suspect.143 In these cases, suspects were tracked for 48 hours.
The remaining portions of all four potential surveys were
identical; each containing an additional identical hypothetical,
followed by a series of demographic questions. The second
hypothetical presented to all respondents was taken loosely from the
facts of Katz and was included as an attempt to determine whether
the Katz Court properly administered its own test.'" If the research
140. While it may be argued that the question presupposes that there is an expectation
of privacy, thereby distorting the data by biasing the respondent, this author contends that
the bias is mitigated by the ability to answer strongly in the negative and that any and all
such responses are interpreted to mean that the respondent did not believe the individual
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
141. See Appendix, survey one.
142. See Appendix, survey two.
143. See Appendix, surveys three and four.
144. See Appendix, the second hypothetical from any one of the four surveys.
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indicates that the original Court did get it correct, it demonstrates
that perhaps the test is not as flawed as has been suggested and that
with an honest and deliberative process, our courts can accurately
apply the Katz test to any factual scenario no matter how complex the
technology involved.
B. The Results
Society overwhelmingly believes that GPS tracking is
unjustifiable and violates an individual's privacy rights, a conclusion
which indicates that the use of GPS tracking devices undoubtedly
qualifies as a "search" for purposes of Fourth Amendment
protections. Had the Court decided the issue on the basis of Katz, the
concurring Justices were clearly correct in concluding that GPS
tracking constitutes a search.
In all four GPS tracking scenarios modeled, the respondents
firmly believed that GPS tracking was unjustifiable and violated
social norms about reasonable expectations of privacy:
Officer's Actions Justified: Agree Disagree
4 Months/Low Suspicion 88% 6%
4 Months/High Suspicion 66% 23%
48 Hours/Low Suspicion 73% 15%
48 Hours/High Suspicion 72% 15%
Privacy Violated: Agree Disagree
4 Months/Low Suspicion 94% 2%
4 Months/High Suspicion 73% 15%
48 Hours/Low Suspicion 84% 12%
48 Hours/High Suspicion 74% 14%
When police utilize GPS devices based on limited probable cause
and utilize these devices for an extended period of time, respondents
resoundingly rejected state actions as a violation of the suspected
individual's privacy rights. Respondents were asked to read the
following hypothetical and respond accordingly:
Officer Jones, who was off-duty, was running routine
personal errands at a local Home Depot when he noticed
Gary loading several large bags of fertilizer into his vehicle.
Gary caught Officer Jones' attention because the officer
recognized the fertilizer he was loading as a kind often used
for growing marijuana. Based on this knowledge, Officer
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Jones followed Gary back to his home, where the officer
noticed that Gary did not appear to have a yard which would
require the amount of fertilizer that he had recently
purchased. The next day, without getting a warrant, Officer
Jones returned to Gary's home and attached a GPS tracking
device to the underside of Gary's vehicle. The police tracked
Gary's movements for the next four months.
The police officer was justified in tracking Gary's movements
over four months.
1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
disagree
Gary's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
disagree
The average answer to question one was 4.323, meaning that the
average respondent fell somewhere in between strongly disagreeing
and disagreeing that the officer's actions were justified. Eighty-eight
percent of respondents disagreed that the officer's actions were
justified, with only 6 percent agreeing." More importantly, 94
percent of respondents agreed that the individual's privacy was
violated, with only 2 percent disagreeing with the statement; the
average answer to question two was 1.635. When the officer tracked
the defendant for 48 hours instead of four months, respondents were
nearly as vigorous in their responses. The average response to
question one was 4.024, with 73 percent of respondents disagreeing
that the officer's actions were justified and only 15 percent agreeing
with the statement. The average response to question two was 1.854,
with 84 percent of respondents agreeing that the individual's privacy
was violated and only 12 percent disagreeing.
Even when respondents were presented with significant probable
cause to believe an individual is actually engaged in criminal activity,
their responses still indicate that GPS tracking violates reasonable
expectations of privacy and therefore amounts to a search as defined
145. All following percentages combine respondents who strongly agree and agree
into one category, agree. Similarly, percentages of those who "disagree" represent the
aggregate of all respondents who either disagree or strongly disagree.
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by the Katz test. Respondents were presented with the following
scenario and then asked to respond accordingly:
Police received a tip from a credible informant that Ben
was selling large amounts of cocaine. Based on this tip, police
obtained permission to wiretap Ben's phone and were able to
record numerous conversations implicating Ben in the sale of
cocaine. In an attempt to gather further evidence, police
decided they would track Ben's movements with a GPS
tracking device. Without obtaining a warrant, Officer Willis
secretly placed a GPS unit on the underside of Ben's vehicle.
The police tracked Ben's movements for the next four
months.
Officer Willis was justified in tracking Ben's movements over
four months.
1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
disagree
Ben's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
disagree
The average response to question one was 3.676 and a significant
majority still believed the actions were unjustified. Sixty-six percent
of respondents disagreed with the premise that the officer's actions
were justified under these circumstances, while only 23 percent
believed the actions were justified. More importantly, the average
response to question two was 2.203, indicating respondents agree that
the right to privacy is violated when the police utilize GPS tracking
devices under these circumstances. Seventy-three percent of
respondents still believed the individual's right to privacy was
violated while only 15 percent of respondents disagreed with this
statement. The same scenario was also presented to another 69
respondents, with the officer tracking the suspected cocaine dealer's
movements for 48 hours instead of four months. Of these
respondents, 72 percent still disagreed that the actions were justified,
while only 15 percent believed they were. The average of all 69
responses was 3.754 for question one. Finally, even though this
scenario arguably presented the most defensible grounds for the use
168 [Vol. 40:1
of GPS tracking, 74 percent of respondents agreed that the
individual's privacy was violated and only 14 percent disagreed."
From circumstances in which the State has probable cause to
believe an individual is engaged in criminal activity to those in which
the belief is merely a hunch-and from tracking that lasts anywhere
from four months to 48 hours-society consistently recognizes that
GPS tracking is unjustified. The strong inverse correlation between
the belief that it is justified and the belief that it violates expectations
of privacy indicates a strong correlative and arguably causal
relationship between these beliefs.
Clearly then, Justice Sotomayor's skepticism about the public
exposure doctrine was warranted. 147  The fact this exact legal
conclusion-that privacy expectations are unreasonable once
something is publicly viewed-led the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuit Courts to incorrectly conclude society would not perceive
GPS tracking as violating an individual's reasonable expectations of
privacy, further undermines the credibility of this doctrine. However,
before concluding that the public exposure doctrine is responsible for
our judiciary's shortcomings, the viability of the Katz test itself needs
to be explored.
C. Did Katz Get It Right?
The Supreme Court itself observed that the Katz test "has often
been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable." 48
But provided society's privacy expectations are consistent and
discernible, the test provides a powerful bulwark for our Fourth
Amendment rights against increasingly technologically sophisticated
and intrusive law enforcement tools. The beauty of the test is that it
endows society with the ability to determine for itself the appropriate
balance between public safety considerations and civil liberty
considerations. If society narrowly circumscribes its privacy interests
to prioritize law and order, then society will circumscribe the scope of
what it considers reasonably private. Conversely, if society chooses to
prioritize its civil liberties then it will broaden the scope of activities
for which its members are accorded reasonable expectations of
privacy. Either way, it makes society the arbiter of its own
constitutional protections, an ideal that rests at the heart of our
democratic system. Although society's expectations may change on
146. The average response for question two was 2.116.
147. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring),
148. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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this issue over time, this does not reflect unpredictability as much as
adaptability, something to be desired if the Constitution is to remain
relevant for decades to come. But the test is only as good as our
courts are at applying it and if the courts prove unable to accurately
determine what society's expectations are, then the application of the
Katz test will result in unpredictability and unmanageability.
It has already been demonstrated that at least with respect to the
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, our courts have a troubling track
record in applying the Katz test to determine whether traditional
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence properly applies to GPS tracking.
Is it simply impossible for our courts to accurately interpret society's
privacy expectations, or does the problem lie in the proxy tests that
the Court has developed to determine "reasonable" expectations of
privacy e.g., the public exposure doctrine? While this research does
not statistically prove that the Katz test is judicially manageable,
demonstrating that the Katz Court itself failed to accurately measure
society's privacy expectations can prove the opposite. That is, there is
no better way to prove the unmanageability of the test than to prove
that the Katz Court itself was mistaken in the application of its own
test. Conversely, if the Court was correct in concluding that society
recognized Mr. Katz's expectation of privacy inside a phone booth as
reasonable, then we have evidence that at least one group of Justices
was capable of applying the test. To determine if the Katz Court was
correct in its holding, every respondent was asked to read the
following hypothetical and respond accordingly:
Dan's cell phone ran out of batteries and he entered a phone
booth to make a phone call. Officer Green had probable cause
that Dan was involved in illegal gambling. Without obtaining
a warrant, Officer Green attached a device to the outside of
the booth, which allowed him to hear Dan's side of the
conversation.
Officer Green was justified in attaching the device and
listening to Dan's side of the conversation.
1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
disagree
Dan's right to privacy was violated by the police.
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1. Strongly agree 2. Agree. 3. Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
disagree
Had the members of the Katz majority been asked to predict society's
responses, they would have anticipated that society would disagree
with the first premise and agree with the second premise. According
to the 321 individuals who were posed with the fact pattern from Katz
and asked if the officer's actions were justified, 131 people strongly
disagreed, 112 people disagreed, 20 were unsure, 47 agreed and 11
strongly agreed. Thus, society disagreed with the actions taken by the
FBI agents in Katz.149
But did this belief stem from a general conviction that the
officer's actions violated a perceived privacy norm or was this
reaction to the officer's actions a result of something else? If the
disapproval of the officer's actions was based on the belief that the
state had unacceptably infringed on Dan's privacy expectations, we
would expect that question two would produce comparably significant
results. When asked if Dan's "privacy was violated by the police,"
127 people strongly agreed, 129 people agreed, 12 people were
unsure, 44 people disagreed and 9 people strongly disagreed.
Translated into a function of percentages, the responses broke down
as follows:
Agree Unsure Disagree
Officer's Actions Justified: 18% 6% 76%
Privacy Violated: 80% 4% 16%
Thus, society overwhelmingly agreed that the officer's actions
violated Mr. Katz's right to privacy."o In fact, a comparison of the
average responses to each question reveals that people felt even
stronger that his right to privacy was violated than they did that the
officer's actions were unjustified."' On the whole, responses to these
questions were remarkably similar. The vast majority of people who
found the actions unjustified also found that privacy was violated.
Conversely, the people who found the actions justified also found that
privacy was not violated. Whether this is the result of a causal or
149. The actual average of all of these answers was 3.9506.
150. The actual average of all 321 respondent answers was 1.9938.
151. 3.9502, an answer that falls slightly on the weaker side of disagree (that the
officer's actions were justified) as compared to 1.9938, an answer that falls slightly on the
stronger side of agree (that his privacy was violated.)
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merely correlative relationship is yet to be determined, but it is clear
that there is a distinct and discernible relationship between justifiable
state action and respect for its citizens' right to privacy.
Most importantly, it is clear that Katz was correct when it held
that an individual's expectation of privacy inside of a phone booth is
an expectation that "society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable."'52 Despite the anachronistic nature of a phone booth in
contemporary society, respondents clearly believed that state action
to monitor the conversation taking place inside that phone booth
violated a clearly defined privacy norm and that it was unjustifiable
for the authorities to do so. While this does not incontrovertibly
demonstrate that the test is administrable in all circumstances, it does
demonstrate that with careful consideration our courts can accurately
determine society's privacy expectations. However, when the Court
attempts to develop proxy tests in an attempt to circumvent a case-by-
case, factual analysis, what the Court makes up in predictability it
more than loses in terms of the ability to freely and flexibly
contemplate society's actual privacy expectations. A careful
juxtaposition of Justice Sotomayor's and Justice Alito's opinions
illustrates how these tests have the potential to lead the Court astray
from the ultimate question before them.
D. How Duration Affects Privacy Expectations
In Jones, police tracked Mr. Jones' movement for twenty-eight
days while investigating him for charges related to the sale of
cocaine." The minority accepted Knotts-and therefore the public
exposure doctrine-as controlling, leading the analysis to be deflected
away from a careful consideration of what society itself might find
reasonable, as required by Katz." Knotts held that tracking an
individual's movements from point A to point B was not a "search"
because an individual did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his discrete movements on public thoroughfares.'
Consequently, Justice Alito was careful to acknowledge that although
"relatively short-term monitoring of a person's movements on public
streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
152. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
153. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (note that
Maynard is the companion case to Jones and as such, contains the factual citations for the
latter case as well.)
154. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
155. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
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recognized as reasonable," longer term monitoring, as was the case in
Jones, "impinges on expectations of privacy.""'
Detractors have criticized similar holdings-such as the D.C.
Circuit Court holding in Jones' companion case, Maynard-as
indefensibly vague and impractical, since it would seemingly permit
GPS tracking for hours or even several days, but not for twenty-eight
days. 7 Tellingly, even Justice Alito's concurrence was unable to
provide meaningful guidance for determining at what point the line
between a permissible and impermissible search could be drawn."'
Similarly, Justice Scalia saw "no reason to go rushing forward" to
"grapple with these vexing problems" when the case could otherwise
be determined on alternate grounds."' Scholars and academics have
already spent considerable time discerning where, when, and how to
draw this line, and with the Jones concurrence garnering four votes,'
the fervor of this debate will only grow.
On the other hand, Justice Sotomayor's simple act of questioning
the public exposure doctrine nullifies the entire debate, potentially
streamlining and simplifying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for
courts and scholars alike.' By considering society's privacy
expectations, uninhibited by the public exposure doctrine, the
concurrence was able to avoid reconciling Knotts with Jones because
contemporary technological advances rendered the underlying
rationale of the former inapplicable to the latter. The merit of this
approach-a holistic, subjective, and flexible consideration of
society's expectations-is underscored by the research, which
demonstrates that not only was the concurrence correct in opining
that the GPS monitoring in Jones would offend society's reasonable
expectations of privacy, but also that the duration of time is largely
irrelevant to this analysis.
Roughly 50 percent of respondents were given hypothetical
scenarios that involved GPS tracking for 48 hours, while the other 50
percent were given hypothetical scenarios that took place
continuously for four months. Of the individuals given the marijuana
156. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
157. Case Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amendment-D.C. Circuit Deems
Warrantless Use of GPS Device an Unreasonable Search, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 833
(2011).
158. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
160. The minority arguably had five votes, if one includes J. Sotomayor's, who agreed
in everything but her vote.
161. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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scenario in which the officer tracked the individual for four months,
the average response among the 96 respondents asked whether the
individual's privacy was violated was 1.635, with 1 being strongly
agree and 2 being agree; as compared to the 82 individuals presented
with the same hypothetical in which the individual was tracked for 48
hours, the average answer was 1.854. Thus, while individuals were
less likely to strongly agree that privacy was violated when the
tracking commenced more than 48 hours than when it took place over
four months, they were still firmly convinced that his privacy was
indeed violated.162
Privacy Violated: Agree Disagree
4 Months/Low Suspicion 94% 2%
48 Hours/Low Suspicion 84% 12%
4 Months/High Suspicion 73% 15%
48 Hours/High Suspicion 74% 14%
Officer's Actions Justified: Agree Disagree
4 Months/Low Suspicion 88% 6%
48 Hours/Low Suspicion 73% 15%
4 Months/High Suspicion 66% 23%
48 Hours/High Suspicion 72% 15%
Despite the importance placed on duration (of the tracking) by the
Court, it appears that this variable has a marginal impact on society's
determination of the reasonableness of the officer's actions and the
defendant's privacy expectations. With palpable data demonstrating
that even short-term GPS tracking offends privacy expectations
deemed reasonable by our society, Justice Sotomayor was correct in
calling for the Court to reconsider the assumption the public exposure
doctrine remains viable as a per se rule in applying the Katz two-
prong test.
E. How Prior-Confirmed Suspicion Affects Privacy Expectations
For this comparison, the models standardized the duration
variable and compared the results when the prior confirmed suspicion
varied. Therefore, the results from the marijuana survey and the
cocaine survey were compared when the tracking took place for the
162. Comparable results were present for the scenario involving high degree of
confirmed suspicion, in which longer tracking resulted in stronger consensus that privacy
was violated, but only to a marginal degree.
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same amount of time." When asked to read the hypothetical that
contained the relatively innocuous facts on which the officer elected
to base the decision to track the suspected marijuana dealer for four
months, 88 percent of respondents disagreed that the officer's actions
were justified while 6 percent agreed.'" Similarly, 94 percent of
respondents agreed that the individual's privacy was violated, with
only 2 percent disagreeing with the statement. But when presented
with the scenario in which the officer had a high degree of confirmed
probable cause that the suspect was involved in the sale of narcotics
and tracked the suspect for four months, 66 percent of respondents
disagreed with the premise that the officer's actions were justified
while 23 percent believed the actions were justified. Similarly, 73
percent of respondents still believed the individual's right to privacy
was violated while only 15 percent of respondents disagreed with this
statement.
Officer's Actions Justified: Agree Disagree
Low Suspicion 88% 6%
High Suspicion 66% 23%
Privacy Violated: Agree Disagree
Low Suspicion 94% 2%
High Suspicion 73% 15%
Society was nearly as vigorous in its responses when the same
scenario was modeled but when the officer tracked the defendant for
48 hours:
Officer's Actions Justified: Agree Disagree
Low Suspicion 73% 15%
High Suspicion 72% 15%
Privacy Violated: Agree Disagree
Low Suspicion 84% 12%
High Suspicion 74% 14%
163. See appendix for full surveys.
164. All following percentages combine respondents who strongly agree and agree
into one category, agree. Similarly, percentages of those who "disagree" represent the
aggregate of all respondents who either disagree or strongly disagree.
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In both the 48-hour and the four-month models, what would
legally be considered the elements of probable cause in a warrant
affidavit significantly altered the percentage of respondents who
believed that the police actions violated the individual's reasonable
expectations of privacy. This demonstrates that probable cause has
an impact on society's readiness to believe an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her movements. However, it is
possible that these results should not be perceived as a willingness of
society to strip individuals of their privacy expectations under these
circumstances. Rather, it can be interpreted as further evidence of
society's disposition toward the role that the judiciary plays in
protecting society's privacy expectations-the requirement that the
courts determine the existence of probable cause before authorizing a
warrant to track an individual with GPS technology. By finding that
the government actions constituted a search on the trespass grounds,
the Court left open the possibility that the determination of probable
cause by a neutral and detached magistrate may yet be taken away, a
process which this data plausibly demonstrates society believes is
critical to the reasonableness of both the officer's actions and the
individual's privacy expectations.
F. The Impact of Gender and Ethnicity on Privacy Expectations
By including the Katz hypothetical in this research, it provided
the study with a standardized question from which to analyze
individual segments of "society" and attempt to determine whether
society has a monolithic view of privacy expectations or whether
different socioeconomic groups vary amongst themselves with respect
to their privacy expectations. To accomplish this, all 321 responses
were broken down by gender, ethnicity, income, and education to
determine if these characteristics could predict how individuals
viewed expectations of privacy and authority in general. To begin
with, the study considered the impact of gender on privacy
expectations. When presented with the hypothetical from Katz, male
and female respondents answered accordingly:
Were the officer's actions justified:
Agree Unsure Disagree
Women 18% 7% 75%
Men 18% 6% 76%
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Was the individual's privacy violated:
Agree Unsure Disagree
Women 79% 6% 15%
Men 80% 2% 18%
These responses were remarkably close with regards to both
questions, indicating that gender is irrelevant in the analysis.
Responses varied more significantly when broken down by self-
reported ethnicity, a factor that did appear to have some impact on
whether individuals were willing to accept the police actions as
justified and to conclude that an individual's privacy was not violated
by the officer's actions in the Katz scenario:
Were the officer's actions justified:
Agree Unsure Disagree
Latino'65  18% 6% 76%
AfricanArican 3% 6% 91%American
Caucasian 20% 7% 73%
Asian American 38% 11% 51%
Was the individual's privacy violated:
Agree Unsure Disagree
Latino 76% 0% 24%
African
Amrian 88% 3% 9%American
Caucasian 77% 5% 18%
Asian American 72% 6% 22%
165. The sample of Latino respondents only contained seventeen respondents and
may be too small of a sample size to get an appropriate representation. Regardless, the
results are printed here for full disclosure and accuracy.
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When considering this data, it appears that ethnic groups have
marginally different privacy expectations and in some cases,
significantly different perspectives on what degree of state intrusion
they are willing to tolerate as justifiable. At the opposite ends of the
spectrum in both of these cases lie African Americans and Asian
Americans. Asian-American respondents were 40 percent more
likely to believe that the officer's actions in Katz were justified than
their African American peers. This was also mirrored in the two
groups' perception that the individual's privacy was violated by the
officer's actions, where African-Americans were 13 percent more
likely to conclude that Mr. Katz' privacy was violated than Asian
American respondents. In between these two extremes lie
respondents who self-identified as Caucasian and Latino.
The most important conclusion for the purposes of this analysis
is the fact that while these groups differed as to whether the officer's
actions were justifiable, there was a significantly greater consensus
that the individual's privacy was violated. Viewed from this
perspective the results indicate that the Katz test, with its emphasis on
society's perception of reasonable privacy expectations, is prone to
represent the beliefs of broad swaths of society and ensures that large
groups of individuals are not held to standards that fail reflect their
beliefs. For example, in theory, it would be possible for the Court to
define a search by the justifiability of the officer's actions. However,
as this data demonstrates, society is much more apt to disagree as to
whether police action is justified than it is about the reasonableness of
one's privacy. This data further establishes the desirability of the
Katz test as best representative of society's expectations. It reflects
the fact that despite relative differences in our individual privacy
expectations, society broadly rejects warrantless GPS tracking as a
violation of the reasonable expectations of privacy in our day-to-day
lives.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Katz two-prong test still presents a viable and
administrable formulation for determining whether the actions of the
State constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Its democratic nature and innate flexibility empower
our courts with the means to ensure that the Fourth Amendment
remains relevant well into the 21st century. The data from this study
166. In some regressive models, income proved significant but on the whole neither
education nor incomes were significant predictors of people's privacy expectations.
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is unequivocal; society firmly believes that in the vast majority of
circumstances the use of GPS tracking devices impedes on a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, it demonstrates that
factors previously thought to be dispositive, namely the duration of
the tracking, do not in fact influence society's conviction that GPS
tracking violates reasonable expectations of privacy.
The Court had an opportunity to reassert itself as the steward of
society's Fourth Amendment protections in Jones. Instead, five
Justices balked and decided to kick the proverbial "can" down the
road. But if we dig a little further, we find that their opinion was one
of necessity, born from the conflicting conclusions that while such
invasive tracking surely requires a warrant, Knotts, Karo, and the
public-exposure doctrine preclude them from finding as such. To be
sure, fidelity to precedent is an admirable quality that one can hope
our Justices continue to embrace. But when that precedent no longer
applies, our Court should not be afraid to reexamine, and if
necessary, overrule it. The Katz two-prong test was established under
these very circumstances and for the past 45 years it has served its
purpose well.'67 It can continue to do so, but only if the Court
consistently and conscientiously applies this test, as Justice
Sotomayor so artfully did in Jones.
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that technology had
advanced to such a degree, that a Fourth Amendment test based on physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area was no longer viable).
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APPENDIX
Survey One
My name is Zachary Gray and I am conducting this survey as
part of a law school seminar study at UC Hastings College of the
Law. Answering the survey will take less than five minutes of your
time. Your answers will remain confidential and no record will be
kept of your identity. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Please, read the following two stories and indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree with the statements that follow.
A. Officer Jones, who was off-duty, was running routine personal
errands at a local Home Depot when he noticed Gary loading several
large bags of fertilizer into his vehicle. Gary caught Officer Jones'
attention because the officer recognized the fertilizer he was loading
as a kind often used for growing marijuana. Based on this knowledge,
Officer Jones followed Gary back to his home, where the officer
noticed that Gary did not appear to have a yard which would require
the amount of fertilizer that he had recently purchased. The next day,
without getting a warrant, Officer Jones returned to Gary's home and
attached a GPS tracking device to the underside of Gary's vehicle.
The police tracked Gary's movements for the next four months.
'The police officer was justified in tracking Gary's movements
over four months.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Gary's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
B. Dan's cell phone ran out of batteries and he entered a phone
booth to make a phone call. Officer Green had probable cause that
Dan was involved in illegal gambling. Without obtaining a warrant,
Officer Green attached a device to the outside of the booth, which
allowed him to hear Dan's side of the conversation.
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Officer Green was justified in attaching the device and listening
to Dan's side of the conversation.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Dan's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree. 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Finally, please tell me a little bit about yourself:
Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other
Race: substitute by the two questions in the US Census
Education:
- Didn't get my high school diploma
- High School Diploma
- Some College/AA Degree
- College Degree, B.A./B.S.
- M.S./Ph.D./J.D./MBA/Other advanced degree
Income (if you are a student, please answer according to your
parents' income):
$1,000-$24,000 - $25,000-$45,000 - $46,000-$65,000 - $66,000-
$100,000 - $101,000+
Survey Two
My name is Zachary Gray and I am conducting this survey as
part of a law school seminar study at UC Hastings College of the
Law. Answering the survey will take less than five minutes of your
time. Your answers will remain confidential and no record will be
kept of your identity. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Please, read the following two stories and indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree with the statements that follow.
A. Officer Jones, who was off-duty, was running routine personal
errands at a local Home Depot when he noticed Gary loading several
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large bags of fertilizer into his vehicle. Gary caught Officer Jones'
attention because the officer recognized the fertilizer he was loading
as a kind often used for growing marijuana. Based on this knowledge,
Officer Jones followed Gary back to his home, where the officer
noticed that Gary did not appear to have a yard which would require
the amount of fertilizer that he had recently purchased. The next day,
without getting a warrant, Officer Jones returned to Gary's home and
attached a GPS tracking device to the underside of Gary's vehicle.
The police tracked Gary's movements for the next 48 hours.
The police officer was justified in tracking Gary's movements
over 48 hours.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Gary's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
B. Dan's cell phone ran out of batteries and he entered a phone
booth to make a phone call. Officer Green had probable cause that
Dan was involved in illegal gambling. Without obtaining a warrant,
Officer Green attached a device to the outside of the booth, which
allowed him to hear Dan's side of the conversation.
Officer Green was justified in attaching the device and listening to
Dan's side of the conversation.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Dan's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree. 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Finally, please tell me a little bit about yourself:
Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other
Race: substitute by the two questions in the US Census
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:1182
HERDING KATZ
Education:
- Didn't get my high school diploma
- High School Diploma
- Some College/AA Degree
- College Degree, B.A./B.S.
- M.S./Ph.D./J.D./MBA/Other advanced degree
Income (if you are a student, please answer according to your
parents' income):
$1,000-$24,000 - $25,000-$45,000 - $46,000-$65,000 - $66,000-
$100,000 - $101,000+
Survey Three
My name is Zachary Gray and I am conducting this survey as
part of a law school seminar study at UC Hastings College of the
Law. Answering the survey will take less than five minutes of your
time. Your answers will remain confidential and no record will be
kept of your identity. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Please, read the following two stories and indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree with the statements that follow.
A. Police received a tip from a credible informant that Ben was
selling large amounts of cocaine. Based on this tip, police obtained
permission to wiretap Ben's phone and were able to record numerous
conversations implicating Ben in the sale of cocaine. In an attempt to
gather further evidence, police decided they would track Ben's
movements with a GPS tracking device. Without obtaining a warrant,
Officer Willis secretly placed a GPS unit on the underside of Ben's
vehicle. The police tracked Ben's movements for the next four
months.
Officer Willis was justified in tracking Ben's movements over
four months.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
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Ben's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
B. Dan's cell phone ran out of batteries and he entered a phone
booth to make a phone call. Officer Green had probable cause that
Dan was involved in illegal gambling. Without obtaining a warrant,
Officer Green attached a device to the outside of the booth, which
allowed him to hear Dan's side of the conversation.
Officer Green was justified in attaching the device and listening
to Dan's side of the conversation.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Dan's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree. 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Finally, please tell me a little bit about yourself:
Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other
Race: substitute by the two questions in the US Census
Education:
- Didn't get my high school diploma
- High School Diploma
- Some College/AA Degree
- College Degree, B.A./B.S.
- M.S./Ph.D./J.D./MBA/Other advanced degree
Income (if you are a student, please answer according to your
parents' income):
$1,000-$24,000 - $25,000-$45,000 - $46,000-$65,000 - $66,000-
$100,000 - $101,000+
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Survey Four
My name is Zachary Gray and I am conducting this survey as
part of a law school seminar study at UC Hastings College of the
Law. Answering the survey will take less than five minutes of your
time. Your answers will remain confidential and no record will be
kept of your identity. Thank you very much for your cooperation!
Please, read the following two stories and indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree with the statements that follow.
A. Police received a tip from a credible informant that Ben was
selling large amounts of cocaine. Based on this tip, police obtained
permission to wiretap Ben's phone and were able to record numerous
conversations implicating Ben in the sale of cocaine. In an attempt to
gather further evidence, police decided they would track Ben's
movements with a GPS tracking device. Without obtaining a warrant,
Officer Willis secretly placed a GPS unit on the underside of Ben's
vehicle. The police tracked Ben's movements for the next 48 hours.
Officer Willis was justified in tracking Ben's movements for 48
hours.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Ben's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
B. Dan's cell phone ran out of batteries and he entered a phone
booth to make a phone call. Officer Green had probable cause that
Dan was involved in illegal gambling. Without obtaining a warrant,
Officer Green attached a device to the outside of the booth, which
allowed him to hear Dan's side of the conversation.
Officer Green was justified in attaching the device and listening
to Dan's side of the conversation.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
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Dan's right to privacy was violated by the police.
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree. 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly
Disagree
Finally, please tell me a little bit about yourself:
Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 3. Other
Race: substitute by the two questions in the US Census
Education:
- Didn't get my high school diploma
- High School Diploma
- Some College/AA Degree
- College Degree, B.A./B.S.
- M.S./Ph.D./J.D./MBA/Other advanced degree
Income (if you are a student, please answer according to your
parents' income):
$1,000-$24,000 - $25,000-$45,000 - $46,000-$65,000 - $66,000-
$100,000 - $101,000+
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